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A Penny for the Court’s Thoughts?
The High Price of Judicial Elections
Bronson D. Bills ∗
“[I]t was ‘never contemplated that the individual who has to protect our
individual rights would have to consider what decision would produce the
most votes.’” 1
– Justice John Paul Stevens
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

When commenting on the importance of judicial independence, the great John
Marshall once opined: “I have always thought, from my earliest youth till now that the
greatest scourge an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and sinning people,
was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependent judiciary.” 2 In keeping with that statement,
this article undertakes an assessment of one of the most fundamental principles in the
Anglo-American legal system: judicial independence. It is a time-honored ideal that
must be, in the words of Justice Brennan, “jealously guarded against outside
interference.” 3 Specifically, this article examines judicial elections, as currently used by
some states across America today, 4 and demonstrates how these elections, now more than
∗

Associate, Brayton & Purcell, Salt Lake City, Utah; written while clerking for the Honorable J. Thomas
Greene, Senior Judge, United States District Court for the District of Utah. [Editor’s Note: The author
formerly clerked for Justice Nancy Saitta while she was a Nevada District Court Judge.] This article is
dedicated to my good friend and mentor Judge Lawrence J. Block, United States Court of Federal Claims.
Once again, “if I have seen further than others, it is because I have stood on the shoulders of Giants.”
Bronson D. Bills, Note, Does Jurisdiction Matter to the Tenth Circuit? Utahns for Better Transp. v. U.S.
Dep’t. of Transp., 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 747, 747 (2004) (quoting Letter from Sir Isaac Newton to
Robert Hooke, February 5, 1676, quoted in STEPHEN HAWKING, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: THE
GREAT WORKS OF PHYSICS AND ASTRONOMY 725 (Stephen Hawking ed., Running Press Book Publishers
2001) (2002)). I would also like to thank Taylor Broadhead, J.D. Candidate 2010, Cornell Law School, for
his research assistance. All ideas, as well as errors, as the old saying goes, are my own.
1
Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid Efforts to Intimidate and
Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 310 (1997) (citing Justice
John Paul Stevens, Opening Assembly Address, American Bar Association Annual Meeting 12 (Aug. 3,
1996) (quoting Florida Supreme Court Justice Ben Overton) (on file with the New York University Law
Review)).
2
Jefferson B. Fordham & Theodore H. Husted, Jr., John Marshall and the Rule of Law, 104 U. PA. L. REV.
57, 61 (1955) (quoting PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION OF 1829-30, at
615-19 (1830)). Other notable giants, such as ex-President William Taft, felt likewise. See WILLIAM H.
TAFT, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 6 (1913) (noting that judicial elections are inherently
“disgraceful” and “so shocking . . . that we ought to condemn without stint a system which can encourage
or permit such demagogic methods of securing judicial position”).
3
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 409 (1989) (citing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982)).
4
Currently, thirty-nine states use judicial elections to appoint some or all of their judges to the bench. See
Raymund A. Sobocinski, Adumbrations on Judicial Campaign Speech, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 193, 201-02
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ever, jeopardize the autonomy of the courts, threaten individual liberties and erode the
esteem of the judiciary in the eyes of the public. 5 Judicial elections require judges to
solicit contributions from donors who will likely appear before them in court—a fact that
may influence a judge’s future decision making, and certainly, if nothing else, creates the
appearance of judicial impropriety. 6 Judicial elections also invite unqualified candidates
with deep pockets to run for judgeships, 7 “destroy[] the traditional respect for the
bench,” 8 and virtually guarantee that judges will base their decisions partially, if not
completely, upon the vicissitudes of popular politics instead of the law. 9 Accordingly,
(2006).
5
See Thomas R. Phillips, Electoral Accountability and Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 137, 142
(2003) (“Each election cycle, additional states experience divisive, expensive, agenda-driven campaigns,
increasingly accompanied by independent expenditures from national interest groups. The problem is now
national in scope, and it demands national attention. If we do nothing, we risk not just an erosion, but
indeed a meltdown in respect for the courts and the rule of law.”); see also Mark A. Behrens & Cary
Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 273, 309-10 (2002).
6
Former Nevada Supreme Court Justice Bob Rose, who concurred in Guinn v. Nevada State Legislature,
71 P.3d 1269 (Nev. 2003), overruled in part by Nevadans for Nev. v. Beers, 142 P.3d 339 (Nev. 2006), but
decided to retire instead of run for reelection, “laments that judicial candidates must go out and hustle
campaign contributions from lawyers and others who eventually may try cases before them.” Ed Vogel,
Retiring Justice Laments Influence of Money: But He’s Hopeful Times are Changing, LAS VEGAS REV.-J.,
Dec. 26, 2006, at B5, available at http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2006/Dec-26-Tue2006/news/11558186.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2008). Former Justice Rose continued: “I don’t think
money changes a judge’s decision, but it gives a very bad perception to the average person. . . . You have a
lawyer who gave a judge $10,000, and you have a lawyer who gave nothing. Which lawyer do you want to
make arguments for you? Does money talk? I don’t believe so, but it does create the perception of
impropriety to many people.” Id. Although Justice Rose does not believe that “money talks” in Nevada,
there is strong evidence to the contrary. Indeed, prior to the Seat G election, several Nevada judges,
including then-Judge Nancy Saitta (the winner of the Seat G race), were the subject of a Los Angeles Times
article that demonstrated that numerous judges, including Saitta, not only heard cases involving campaign
donors (a conflict of interest?), but also issued rulings that were favorable to the various campaign donors
(another conflict of interest?). See Michael J. Goodman & William C. Rempel, In Las Vegas, They’re
Playing With a Stacked Judicial Deck, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 2006, at B5, available at
http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-na-vegas8jun08,1,7420641.story (last visited Jan. 22, 2008).
7
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788-89 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
8
Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 8 BAYLOR L.
REV. 1, 23 (1956).
9
See, e.g., White, 536 U.S. at 789 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a
Consensus of Constraint: A Judge’s Perspective on Judicial Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969,
1980 (1988) (when asked whether his election year decisions were influenced by the upcoming vote and
public perception, California Supreme Court Justice Joseph Grodin candidly replied, “I just can’t be
sure.”); JOHN H. CULVER & JOHN T. WOLD, JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES 139, 156 (Anthony
Champagne & Judith Haydel eds., University Press of America 1993) (in discussing a case he voted on
prior to his upcoming election in 1982, Justice Otto Kaus of the California Supreme Court stated: “I
decided the case the way I saw it. But to this day, I don’t know to what extent I was subliminally
motivated by the thing you could not forget—that it might do you some good politically to vote one way or
the other.”); Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention Elections and Judicial Behavior, 77 JUDICATURE
306, 313 (1994) (noting that judges’ fears that a “controversial case or opposition by some group, could stir
voters to oust them.”); Robert S. Thompson, Judicial Retention Elections and Judicial Method: A
Retrospective on the California Retention Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2007 (1988); see Deborah
A. Agosti, My Life and the Law: A Short Overview, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 863, 881 (2005) (“I doubt that
many judges now sitting on the bench in Nevada will be in a hurry in the future to make a legally sound
decision that also happens to be repugnant to vocal political extremists.”). Of course, when I speak of the
need for judges to foot their decisions based upon “the law,” I am not suggesting that there is a chemical or
mathematical formula that pre-determines the outcome of any given decision. Rather, when I speak of
basing decisions upon “the law,” I speak of a process whereby judges consider a variety of probative
factors.
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this article urges all states that employ judicial elections to abandon this precarious
method of placing judges on the bench, 10 as the American Bar Association (ABA), 11 the
Supreme Court of the United States, 12 and legal commentators 13 have urged time and time
again. 14
At the crux of this article lies Nevada’s recent 2006 Supreme Court race for Seat
G—another unfortunate judicial election that involves a new and dangerous twist. In the
race for Seat G on Nevada’s high court, incumbent Chief Justice Nancy Becker—who
concurred in the controversial five to one constitutional decision in Guinn v. Nevada
State Legislature, 15 and the first justice in the majority to run for reelection after Guinn
was issued 16 —was ousted by an arguably much less qualified opponent 17 who, with the
help of several wealthy special interest groups and the press, 18 grossly, carelessly, and
“shameless[ly]” 19 distorted the facts of Guinn to the voting public. 20 Considering this
10

See Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., Preserving Judicial Independence—An Exegesis, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 835,
844 (2002) (“By far the most troubling threats to judicial independence are those associated with judicial
elections.”). My call for the Nevada Legislature to amend Article VI should come as no surprise to those
familiar with this area of legal literature. See Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the
Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L.
REV. 759, 760 n.296 (1995) (noting that “calls for new methods of judicial selection frequently come after
elections or other events that diminish the standing of the courts”). Although numerous commentators have
called for reform after an unseemly judicial election, this is the first judicial election, and the first law
journal article for that matter, which revolves around an incumbent being ousted on the basis of a civil
decision.
11
See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(c)(2), Comment (2004) (“Merit selection of judges is
a preferable manner in which to select the judiciary.”); AM. BAR ASS’N, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY:
REPORT ON THE ABA COMMISSION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 96 (1997)
(“The American Bar Association strongly endorses the merit selection of judges, as opposed to their
election . . . . Five times between August 1972 and August 1984 the House of Delegates has approved
recommendations stating the preference for merit selection and encouraging bar associations in
jurisdictions where judges are elected . . . to work for the adoption of merit selection and retention”).
12
See, e.g., White, 536 U.S. at 788 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I join the opinion of the Court but write
separately to express my concerns about judicial elections generally . . . the very practice of electing judges
undermines this interest [a State’s interest in an impartial judiciary].”).
13
See, e.g., generally, Julian N. Eule, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State Courts, Voter Initiatives and the
Threat of Electoral Reprisal, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 733 (1994).
14
The sea of legal literature calling for the abandonment of judicial elections is overwhelming. Indeed, one
commentator, in noting the seemingly endless amount of academic work on the subject, concluded that the
issue has been addressed “ad nauseam.” Alex B. Long, “Stop Me Before I Vote for This Judge Again”:
Judicial Conduct Organizations, Judicial Accountability, and the Disciplining of Elected Judges, 106 W.
VA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2003). In light of Justice Brennan’s admonition to “jealously guard” judicial
independence, commentators and courts should continuously track the status of judicial independence and
welcome new commentary that seeks to protect this time-honored ideal. This article does just that and is
the first article to address a judicial election in which a sitting incumbent was ousted in a judicial election
because of a single, unpopular civil decision. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 409 (1989).
15
71 P.3d 1269 (Nev. 2003), overruled in part by Nevadans for Nev. v. Beers, 142 P.3d 339 (Nev. 2006).
16
Although Justice Becker was the only Justice in the Guinn majority to run for reelection, prior to the Seat
G race, Justice Deborah A. Agosti, the author of Guinn opinion, resigned from the high court after the
attacks launched on her and the Nevada Supreme Court after Guinn was handed down. See Agosti, supra
note 9. Additionally, Justice Bob Rose, who also concurred in the Guinn opinion, retired from the high
court instead of running for reelection. Although Justice Rose retired, it seems clear that in light of Justice
Becker’s fate, both Justice Agosti and Rose would have suffered the same ending.
17
See infra notes 157-167, 175-176, and accompanying text.
18
See infra notes 177-183 and accompanying text.
19
See Jon Ralston, Jon Ralston on this Election Season’s Top 10 Performances, LAS VEGAS SUN, Nov. 1,
2006, at A5 (“[H]ere are the Top 10 nominees for Most Shameless Performance of Campaign ’06 . . . . You
raised our taxes, Justice Becker: Except she didn’t. Judge Nancy Saitta ran an ad accusing Justice Nancy
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unprecedented result, one might rightly feel perplexed, perhaps agitated, with the
realization of liberty jeopardized.
Although the books are full of examples in which an incumbent judge has been
voted out of office in a judicial election and replaced by a less qualified opponent who
distorted the holding of one politically unpopular decision to the voting public, those
elections dealt exclusively with an unpopular criminal decision. 21 The Seat G race,
however, breaks new ground, as Justice Becker lost her seat on the Nevada Supreme
Court not because of a single unpopular criminal decision, but because of a single
unpopular civil tax opinion. 22
To Nevada and America’s dismay, Seat G illustrates that the problems with judicial
elections—once confined to criminal decisions—have now crept into the civil realm of
dispute resolution. It further illustrates that judges who seek retention must now not only
worry about their jobs when making a politically unpopular criminal decision, but also
fear reprisal for making a politically unpopular, yet legally justifiable, decision in a civil
matter. 23 Noting this perilous movement, all states should abandon judicial elections in
all forms, lest the courts become “obligated to do the will of the people, to act like
legislators in surveying the public’s desire and then representing it in its decision making,
rather than dispassionately interpreting the law, and weighing and balancing conflicts in
the law.” 24

Becker of signing onto a decision—the infamous Guinn v. Legislature—that caused the ‘biggest tax
increase’ in the state annals. But it didn’t. The Legislature passed the 2003 increase with two-thirds of
each house.”).
20
See Agosti, supra note 9, at 881 (“The public’s reaction to the decision was being shaped without having
the benefit of hearing anything other than one extreme view of the decision. Even those papers that favored
the decision did so without such an accurate explanation of the decision as would reassure the citizens of
Nevada. The public was told that the court had disregarded the will of the people, had ignored and ‘thrown
out’ a constitutional mandate the voters had placed in the constitution, and had violated principles of law to
get to its result. Of course, none of these accusations were true.”); see also Sean Whaley, State Supreme
Court: Incumbent Justices Lead Opponents But Vast Numbers of Voters Undecided, LAS VEGAS REV.-J.,
Sept. 27, 2006, at 3B, available at http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2006/Sep-27-Wed2006/news/9891060.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2008) (“Becker is the subject of negative ads about the
decision, which suggests she is responsible for the $833 million dollar tax increase approved by the
Legislature. The ads are paid for by a group called Nevadans Against Judicial Activism.”).
21
See infra notes 110-120 and accompanying text; see also e.g., Bright & Keenan, supra note 10.
22
See infra notes 136-167 and accompanying text.
23
One commentator has noted that, in discussing the California Supreme Court election debacle of 1986 in
which three Supreme Court justices were ousted due to a single unpopular criminal decision, the reelection
prospects of these three justices were also hurt because of because of several civil opinions that the court
had issued that were unfavorable to the powerful banking community of California. The commentator,
however, explicitly noted that it was the death penalty opinion which ultimately did the Justices in (or, I
guess one could say, out). See Stephen R. Barnett, California Justice, 78 CAL. L. REV. 247, 255 (1990)
(reviewing JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
(1989)). Additionally, some commentators have speculated that Justice David Lanphier of the Nebraska
Supreme Court may have been defeated in 1996 after he had authored a unanimous opinion invalidating a
term-limits amendment to the state constitution. See Jonathan L. Entin, Judicial Selection and Political
Culture, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 523, 523-24 (2001). However, Justice Lanphier was likely ousted because of
several rulings that overturned second-degree murder convictions. See Traciel V. Reid, The Politicization
of Retention Elections: Lessons from the Defeat of Justices Lanphier and White, 83 JUDICATURE 68, 70-71
(1999).
24
See Agosti, supra note 9, at 881. Agosti’s article emphasizes the movement of the problems of judicial
elections into the civil realm to demonstrate the fact that the problems of judicial elections now threaten all
aspects of our law.
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In the wake of Seat G—an election that will likely go down as one of the more
embarrassing and judicially debasing state supreme court elections in our nation’s
history 25 —it was only apropos that several Nevada Senators proposed Senate Joint
Resolution No. 2 (SJR2), 26 seeking to amend Article VI of the Nevada Constitution.
SJR2, which the Nevada legislature recently enacted, 27 proposed that Nevada eliminate
judicial elections and adopt the “Missouri plan,” 28 which is a merit-based appointment
method by which Nevada District Court Judges and Nevada Supreme Court Justices are
chosen by a nominating commission, appointed by the Governor, and later subject to a
retention vote. 29
Despite this amendment, SJR2 is still insufficient to bolster judicial autonomy and
eliminate the problems Nevada has experienced with judicial elections. As such, this
article urges the Nevada legislature to promulgate legislation to amend various portions
of Article VI. Specifically, this article argues that the Nevada legislature should amend
Article VI, Section 22 of the Nevada Constitution by adding a provision providing for
Senate approval of nominees and setting the term of their judgeship at twelve years. This
article also pleads with all states that retain judicial elections, in any form, to promulgate
legislation that would completely eliminate judicial elections in all forms. For, as the
Seat G election illustrates, judicial elections are a “disgraceful” 30 “scourge” 31 for a variety
of reasons. The people of Nevada and America deserve better than judicial elections;
25

Numerous Nevada media moguls have openly expressed their embarrassment with Nevada’s judicial
elections. See e.g., Jon Ralston, Jon Ralston on the Embarrassing State of Nevada’s Judicial System, LAS
VEGAS SUN, June 9, 2006, at A4. Ralston’s sentiments reflect not only those of Nevadans, but also of those
Americans who are familiar with Nevada’s judicial elections. Cf. Linda P. Campbell, Sitting Ducks on the
Bench, DALLAS FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Nov. 10, 2006, at B1. In this Dallas Fort Worth
newspaper article, recently retired United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor notes that,
out of all the decisions she authored or in which she concurred while a sitting Justice, she wishes that she
could change her vote in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White because of the embarrassing and
undesirable state court elections that have taken place after White was handed down. Campbell’s article, to
no surprise, specifically references the Nevada Seat G race and cites some of the embarrassing and
judicially debasing tactics used by the candidates during the election.
26
S.J. Res. 2, 74th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2007).
27
See Nevada Legislature Bill History of SJR2, http://www.leg.state.nv.us/74th/Reports/history.cfm?
DocumentType=8&BillNo=2. SJR2, which originated in the Senate, passed with a fifteen to six vote in
that house. Afterwards, SJR2 went to the Assembly, where it passed thirty to eleven (with one excused).
On May 31, 2007, SJR2 was enrolled and delivered to the Secretary of State.
28
Missouri was the first State to adopt this method of appointment, thus the name “Missouri plan.” See
LARRY C. BERKSON, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A SPECIAL REPORT 1, 4-5 (Am.
Judicature Society 2004) (1980). Although the Missouri plan tries to inject more judicial independence
into the method of placing judges on the bench, this method of appointment is not without its own set of
problems. Indeed, as will be discussed more fully in Section III, infra, this article concludes that the
retention portion of the Missouri plan is just as dangerous to judicial independence as popular judicial
elections. As Professor Charles Gardner Geyh observed:
[H]orror stories emerging from partisan judicial elections in Texas have led to calls for nonpartisan judicial elections, which can be countered with horror stories from non-partisan
elections in Wisconsin, Ohio and Michigan, which in turn have served as fodder for merit
selection proponents to load their cannons, only to have them backfire in the face of retention
election disasters in Tennessee and Nebraska. All of the foregoing examples are illustrative of
the perils to impartial justice inherent in selecting or retaining judges by popular vote.
Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 74 (2003).
29
See Nev. S. Res. 2.
30
See TAFT, supra note 2, at 418.
31
See Fordham & Husted, Jr., supra note 2, at 61.
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indeed, as Justice Jackson once stated: “One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to free
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may
not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.” 32
The undesirable realities of judicial elections and the recent spread of their ills into
the civil realm of dispute resolution render this method of placing judges on the bench
more dangerous than ever, particularly on the state supreme court level.33 Noting this
reality, it is fortunate that certain politically unpopular decisions—Brown v. Board of
Education 34 and Engel v. Vitale, 35 for example—were brought, and decided, in federal
court, a forum in which highly talented and solicitous judges are given protection from
public retaliation for socially unpopular, yet legally justifiable, decisions.
Section Two of this article begins by defining the term “judicial independence” as
it is used in this article, and then examines the various historical and contemporary views
regarding the importance of judicial independence to the preservation of liberty,
individual rights, and respect for the bench. Section Three looks at judicial elections in
general, and the Seat G election in particular, and demonstrates how these elections
impinge on judicial independence and individual liberties and corrode public respect for
the judiciary. This section also examines SJR2 and demonstrates how these amendments
fail to eliminate the ills associated with judicial elections. Finally, this section discusses
how the Nevada legislature should amend Article VI, Section 22 of the Nevada
Constitution to eliminate these problems. In the Conclusion, this article urges the Nevada
legislature to amend Section 22 (which was amended by SJR2) in the next legislative
session, with the modifications outlined in this article, and pleads with all other states that
still retain judicial elections to follow in Nevada’s footsteps. By completely eliminating
judicial elections, states will be, in the words of the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist,
bolstering “one of the crown jewels of our system of government today.” 36
II. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

¶9

Before discussing historical and contemporary views regarding the significance of
judicial independence, it is imperative to first understand what judicial independence is,
and from whom, or of what, the judiciary is seeking to be independent. The founders
sought to establish judicial independence in two senses, which are interrelated. 37 First,
the founders wanted to make the judiciary literally independent of the two other branches
of government. 38 In other words, the framers sought to create a separate and distinct
judicial branch of government that was autonomous from the legislative and executive
32

W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
One commentator has noted that federal habeas corpus review has been significantly diminished in recent
years because of the increasing trust that the Supreme Court of the United States has placed in state
supreme courts. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 10, at 768-69. Noting this fact, it is clear why it is
important to have judges who are not beholden to public vicissitudes.
34
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregation of children in public schools on
the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
35
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that required participation in official daily classroom
prayer violated the Establishment Clause).
36
Federal Judges Association, http://www.federaljudgesassoc.org/scholars (last visited Jan. 22, 2008).
37
Id. (“The Federal Constitution is structured so as to foster . . . independence in two ways: first, by making
the Judiciary separate from the other two branches of government; and, second, by guaranteeing to Article
III Judges the right to life tenure ‘during good behavior’ and by prohibiting the diminution of their
compensation.”).
38
Id.
33

34
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branches. Second, the founders sought to provide the judiciary with independence in
their decision making by protecting the judiciary from improper outside influences and
from reprisal from the other two branches for unpopular opinions.39 This was done, as
will be discussed more fully below, through the prophylactic protections of life tenure
and fixed salary in Article III of the Constitution. It is this second sense of judicial
independence with which this article is concerned.
¶10
When this article speaks of judicial independence in decision making, it does not
intend to “connote the image of some isolated jurist in the desert completely separated
from reality, including being separated from the legislature and the executive, or immune
from constraints or criticism.” 40 Rather, when this article speaks of judicial
independence, it is speaking of “a general principle of the highest importance to the
proper administration of justice,” 41 and the need for “a judicial officer, in exercising
judicial authority . . . [to] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension
of personal consequences to himself.” 42 In other words, when this article speaks of
judicial independence, it speaks of a position in which a judge, as the interpreter of the
law, will not feel compelled to consider improper factors, to wit, anything other than the
facts and the applicable principles of law.
¶11
The Federal Judges Association (FJA), in discussing judicial independence,
provides an excellent explanation of the concept: “What do we mean by judicial
independence? We mean, in simple terms, an environment in which ‘Article III Judges’
(that is, federal judges appointed pursuant to Article III of the Federal Constitution) are
able to render principled and unbiased court decisions based solely on the ‘rule of law,’
that is, what the law says.” 43 Professor Archibald Cox, in further defining and
articulating what is meant by judicial independence, also stated:
The idea of judicial independence implies: (1) that judges shall decide
lawsuits free from any outside pressure: personal, economic, or political,
including any fear of reprisal; (2) that the courts’ decisions shall be final in
all cases except as changed by general, prospective legislation, and final
upon constitutional questions except as changed by constitutional
amendment; and (3) that there shall be no tampering with the organization
or jurisdiction of the courts for the purposes of controlling their decisions
upon constitutional questions. 44
¶12

Judicial independence thus implies “two reciprocal obligations.” 45 First, judges
must cut ties from “loyalties or implied commitment” to individuals or entities, and
second, judges must foot decisions “‘according to law,’ according to a continuity of
reasoned principle found in the words of the Constitution, statute, or other controlling
39

Id.
Michael Traynor, Judicial Independence: A Cornerstone of Liberty, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 487,
493 (2007).
41
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871).
42
Id.
43
See Federal Judges Association, supra note 36.
44
Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary: History and Purposes, 21 DAYTON L. REV. 565, 566
(1996).
45
Id.
40

35
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instrument, in the implications of its structure and apparent purposes, and in prior judicial
precedents, traditional understanding, and like sources of law.” 46 Those judges who have
not cut ties, or are beholden to outside groups or influenced by politics or who fear
reprisal for unpopular decisions are “putting the independence of the courts at risk.” 47 As
Justice Kennedy observed, the law “makes a promise—neutrality.” 48 Judges who are
beholden to special interests or parties, even ostensibly, fail this great guarantee.
¶13
Turning now to our forefathers, after their painful experiences with the English
monarchy, they came to understand the importance of, and need for, an independent
judiciary. Indeed, the founders considered judicial autonomy so important, so vital, so
essential, that it was one of the express reasons they declared independence from
England. 49 For in England, judges were appointed by the King and served at his
pleasure; 50 judges’ salaries and the length of their tenure were dependent on the King, 51
and judges were often, if not always, removed from the bench by the King when he
disagreed with a judicial decision. 52 From time to time, the King would not only dispense
with judges’ jobs when he was unhappy with their performance, decisions or views, but
also would dispose of judges’ lives. 53 As Thomas Paine aptly observed, in England, the
King was the law. 54

46

Id.
Id.
48
See STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS 1 (Feb. 2002) (quoting Justice Anthony
Kennedy in a speech to an ABA symposium on judicial independence), available at
http://www.abanet.org/judind/pdf/commissionreport4-03.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2008).
49
See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776). In breaking from England, the founders
listed as one of their grievances the fact that the King had made “[j]udges dependent on his Will alone for
the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.”
50
See Grodin, supra note 9, at 1970. In England, prior to the time when the King appointed judges, the
judicial function was intertwined with the Curia Regis, or the King’s Court. Indeed, the King and a group
of advisors (whom he selected) adjudicated all royal legal matters. It was not until after the death of
William the Conqueror that a separate judiciary came into existence. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND
REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 346-47 (1983).
51
See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 49, para. 3; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, at
512 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. Earle ed., 1973) (“Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute
more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support . . . [for] power over a
man’s subsistence amounts to a power over his will.”); cf. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 164, 179 (1994)
(“A fixed term of office . . . is a means of promoting judicial independence, which in turn helps to ensure
judicial impartiality.”).
52
See Frank J. Battisti, An Independent Judiciary or an Evanescent Dream, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 711,
712 n.2 (1975) (noting that the Stuart monarchs often removed judges who issued opinions that were
unfavorable to the Crown). Consider, as an example of the King’s control over the judiciary, when Chief
Edward Coke opposed the King’s claim that the King could sit in lieu of an English judge in a case. Not
only did Coke’s objections fail, but also King James I nearly imprisoned Coke and promised to confine
Coke to the Tower of London if Coke dared challenge the King’s authority again. See Burkeley N. Riggs
& Tamera D. Westerberg, Judicial Independence: An Historical Perspective, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 337, 337
n.3 (1997).
53
See JACK M. SOSIN, THE ARISTOCRACY OF THE LONG ROBE: THE ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN
AMERICA 32 (1989) (discussing the hanging of the chief justice of the King’s Bench in the 14th century).
54
See THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 57 (Penguin Books 1987) (1776) (“Let a day be solemnly set apart
for proclaiming the Charter; let it be brought forth placed on the Divine Law, the Word of God; let a crown
be placed thereon, by which the World may know, that so far as we approve of monarchy, that in America
the law is king. For as in absolute governments the King is Law, so in free Countries the law ought to be
king; and there ought to be no other.”).
47
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¶14

The King’s control of the judiciary extended beyond England and into colonial
America. To be sure, when the King’s dominion of the English judiciary was eliminated
by the 1701 Act of Settlement, King George III continued to exercise power over the
judiciary in colonial America. 55 Indeed, King George III frequently invoked his power
over the colonial courts, repeatedly appointing and removing judges from the colonial
bench, probably to demonstrate to the colonialists that it was the King, not the judge, who
declared what the law was. 56
¶15
Given this tyrannical behavior by the King, the colonialists knew that in order for
America to be a land of liberty and justice, it would need to have a judiciary free from the
control of a King or representative body. 57 They knew that judges needed to be
sufficiently independent from the King so that they could adjudicate legal disputes
without outside pressure or influence. 58 Accordingly, the colonialists, through Article III,
created a judiciary where—much like the judiciary in England after the 1701 Act of
Settlement—federal judges were afforded life tenure and a fixed salary during good
behavior, which could not be diminished while they were in office. 59
¶16
The protections of Article III were explicitly fashioned to combat the undesirable
consequences—which the founders had experienced firsthand 60 —associated with a
judiciary who was beholden to the representative body. These safeguards were grounded
on the idea that “[i]n the general course of human nature, a power over a man’s
subsistence amounts to a power over his will.” 61
¶17
In drafting the structure of Article III, the revolutionaries not only drew heavily
upon their experience with the monarchy in both England and colonial America, they also
drew heavily upon the great legal minds of Blackstone and Montesquieu. 62 Consider, for
55

See Joseph J. Darby, Guarantees and Limits of the Independence and Impartiality of the Judge, 41 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 997, 998 (2004) (“It should be noted that the Act of Settlement of 1701 did not apply to the
English colonies in North America. Colonial judges were regarded by most American colonists as
subservient agents of the King.”).
56
Cf. L. Anthony Sutin, Check, Please: Constitutional Dimensions of Halting the Pay of Public Officials,
26 J. LEGIS. 221, 257 (2000) (noting that the King continued to control Colonial judges after the 1701 Act
of Settlement).
57
The idea of judicial independence is deeply rooted in the history of English law. Consider, for example,
Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (1610), in which Lord Coke held that, in a false imprisonment case
brought by a student against the Board of Censors of the Royal College of Physicians, the Board could not
adjudicate the case against itself because of the interest which the Board had in the outcome of the case.
This view—nemo judex in re sua—or “no man is to be a judge in his own case,” was, undoubtedly,
influential in the founders’ belief that judicial independence was vital to a properly functioning court
system. See Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of
Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 480 (1986). The roots of judicial independence, however, can
be traced to around 350 B.C. and Aristotle and his three elements of government: general assembly, public
officials, and the judiciary. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 165-77 (Ernest Barker trans., R.F. Stalley rev.
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (c. 335-322 B.C.E.).
58
See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776).
59
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
60
See Michael L. Buenger, Of Money and Judicial Independence: Can Inherent Powers Protect State
Courts in Tough Fiscal Times?, 92 KY. L.J. 979, 997 n.56 (2003-04) (“It has been suggested that the
Founders’ conceptual commitment to judicial independence was a reaction to prior experiences under
colonial rule, rather than an outgrowth of a culture that promoted judicial independence as a core governing
principle.”).
61
THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, supra note 51, at 513.
62
See, e.g., Natalie Wexler, In the Beginning: The First Three Chief Justices, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1373,
1377 n.16 (2006); Graham O’Donoghue, Precatory Executive Statements and Permissible Judicial
Responses in the Context of Holocaust-Claims Litigation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1155 n.192 (2006).
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example, the views of Alexander Hamilton—a brilliant Federalist and a significant force
in establishing the protections afforded the judiciary in Article III—regarding judicial
independence. Hamilton, drawing and building upon Blackstone 63 and Montesquieu, 64 in
Federalist Paper No. 78 eloquently examined and discussed the importance of judicial
independence. He believed that judicial independence was “one of the most valuable of
the modern improvements in the practice of government . . . an excellent barrier to the
encroachments and oppressions of the representative body.” 65 Indeed, Hamilton strongly
believed that “‘there is no liberty, if not the power of the judging be not separated from
the legislative and executive powers.’ . . . The complete independence of the courts of
justice is . . . essential . . . .” 66 Like Blackstone and Montesquieu, Hamilton believed that
judicial independence was essential to the preservation of judicial autonomy and, in turn,
the preservation of individual rights, liberty, and the neutral interpretation and application
of the Constitution. 67 He was convinced that liberty “can have nothing to fear from the
judiciary alone, but would have everything to fear from its union with either of the other
departments,” 68 and he strongly supposed that judicial independence was
“indispensable” 69 to the preservation of the law and individual liberty.
¶18
Blackstone, Montesquieu, and Hamilton’s insights and observations regarding
judicial independence have been fortified by years of American experience. Without a
doubt, Article III’s endowments of life tenure and fixed salary have bolstered courts’
autonomy, which in turn has secured the liberties of all Americans and furthered the
public’s respect and faith in the judicial branch. Federal courts, throughout their
existence, have rejoiced in the independence afforded the judiciary through Article III,
and have expressly decried outside influences which may weaken these protections or
otherwise undermine the autonomy of the court at any time. 70 The late Chief Justice
63

With regard to judicial independence, Blackstone stated:
In this distinct and separate existence of the judicial power, in a peculiar body of men,
nominated indeed, but not removable at pleasure, by the crown, consists one main preservative
of the public liberty; which cannot subsist long in any state, unless the administration of
common justice be in some degree separated both from the legislative and also from the
executive power. Were it joined with the legislature, the life, liberty, and property, of the subject
would be in the hands of arbitrary judges, whose decisions would be then regulated only by their
own opinions, and not by any fundamental principles of law; which, though legislators may
depart from, yet judges are bound to observe.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *259-60 (1765), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/
founders/documents/v1ch10s6.html.
64
See CHARLES DE SECONDAT BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, bk. 11, ch. 6, at 157
(Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748) (“Nor is there liberty if the
power of judging is not separate from legislative power and from executive power . . . . If it were joined to
executive power, the judge could have the force of an oppressor.”).
65
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 51, at 583.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
See generally Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring);
see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 409 (1989); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982); Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 861 (1998)
(noting that courts have an ongoing duty “to take steps necessary to maintain public confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary”); Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972) (noting that parties
are entitled to have impartial and detached courts decide merits of case); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523
(1927) (finding a due process violation where a party’s liberty or property is subjected “to the judgment of
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William Rehnquist, in discussing the importance and benefits of judicial autonomy,
stated that the “independence of [the judiciary] . . . is every bit as important in securing
the recognition of the rights granted by the Constitution as is the declaration of those
rights themselves.” 71 Former Justice Penny White of the Tennessee Supreme Court—an
individual all too familiar with the value of judicial independence—aptly noted:
[H]istorical and academic statements about judicial independence may be
somewhat helpful in our effort to assess its significance to our system of
justice, [but] these examples are not nearly as helpful as practical ones.
When thinking about judicial independence, what it is and how essential it
may be, it is perhaps more helpful to think about where we would be
without it. Our courts would be quite different had judicial independence
not been a foundation of our legal system. As we have noted, no
legislative acts would be subject to judicial review because Chief Justice
Marshall would have minded the Jefferson administration, which
characterized Marbury v. Madison as “a brazen attempt to induce the
Supreme Court to interfere unlawfully with the conduct of the Executive
Branch of the Government.” Poll taxes, literacy tests, loyalty oaths,
political gerrymandering, segregated public accommodations, and
lynchings would all have survived because the judiciary would have been
powerless to question, let alone invalidate, the actions of the legislative or
executive branches. 72
Numerous other judges 73 and scholars 74 have echoed the sentiments of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Penny White.
¶19
Having defined judicial independence and identified how that term is used in this
article, this section looks at the difficult duties of today’s judges and demonstrates how
these duties are made even more complex and intricate because of the harsh political
landscape in which judges operate today. By understanding the difficult duties of a judge
and the thorny political climate in which he or she now operates, the reader will better
understand why states should now, more than ever, do everything in their power to
eliminate judicial elections and bolster the independence of their court systems.
¶20
The duties of a judge are complex; the responsibility of interpreting and declaring
what the “law is” 75 is no easy task. United States District Court Judge Bruce S. Jenkins,
a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion
against him in his case”).
71
William H. Rehnquist, An Independent Judiciary: Bulwark of the Constitution, 9 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 8
(1988).
72
Penny White, It’s a Wonderful Life, or Is It? America Without Judicial Independence, 27 U. MEM. L.
REV. 1, 5 (1996) (internal citations omitted).
73
See Bobby R. Baldock et al., A Discussion of Judicial Independence with Judges of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 355, 356 (1997) (noting Judge Baldock’s
belief that the judiciary’s “independence com[es] largely from the constitutional provisions regarding life
tenure and guaranteed compensation”); Judge Thomas I. Vanaskie, The Independence and Responsibility of
the Federal Judiciary, 46 VILL. L. REV. 745, 759-60 (2001) (discussing the value of judicial independence).
74
See generally Scott D. Wiener, Note, Popular Justice: State Judicial Elections and Procedural Due
Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 187 (1996).
75
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-78 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity
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in discussing the role and duty of a judge, has stated: “No judge seeks business. He takes
what comes, and within the tradition of service and the boundaries of power and
competency does the best he can to deal with questions put to him by others. Many a
question is asked that a judge would prefer not to answer, but a judge is duty bound to
answer as best he can.” 76
¶21
One of the many jobs of a judge, indeed, one of the many duties of a judge, is to
answer difficult legal questions. This duty becomes even thornier when the question
involves an unpopular group or a criminal defendant. 77 Judges must, among other things,
protect the Constitutional rights of all—underrepresented individuals, unpopular groups,
and criminals included. Indeed, the Bill of Rights, which judges are duty bound to
uphold and protect, was created for the “very purpose . . . [of] withdraw[ing] certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, [and] to place them beyond the
reach of the majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied
by the courts.” 78 Not only are judges often required to make unpopular decisions
upholding the rights or privileges of unpopular groups or criminal defendants, judges
must, pursuant to their duty as interpreters of the law and checks on legislative and
executive power, invalidate acts of Congress, the executive, or other lawmakers. 79
¶22
Often when judges protect the rights of unpopular groups or invalidate acts of the
legislature or executive, the public is enraged. As the FJA has stated: “Inevitably from
time to time the protection of individual rights requires unpopular decisions that invoke
adverse reactions from the public, its legislative representatives, or the executive
branch.” 80
¶23
In addition to the complex and socially unpopular legal questions that judges must
answer, the difficulty of a judge’s duty is further compounded by the harsh political
landscape in which judges now operate. Today, judges face unparalleled attacks from a
variety of political and special interest groups for their legal decisions. Consider, for
example, some of the comments made by various newspapers across America in recent
times, wherein judges have been dubbed as “idiots,” “fuzzy headed buffoons,” “stooges,”
“arrogantly authoritarian,” “a band of outlaws,” “felonious five,” “transparent shills for
the right wing of the Republican Party,” and “‘judicial sociopaths’ who ‘belong behind
bars’ for their ‘treasonous behavior.’” 81 Consider also the attacks which are being
exerted on the courts by the other two branches of government. Tom DeLay, once House
majority leader from Texas, stated that “[j]udges need to be intimidated.” 82 Former
expound and interpret that rule.”).
76
Bruce S. Jenkins, The Integrity of Words, 1988 UTAH L. REV. 291, 292 (1988).
77
See Susan N. Herman, Commentary, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 339, 339 (1997) (“Article III suggests that
federal judges are expected to take the part of minorities, dissenters, and other politically powerless and
unpopular people, including criminal defendants.”); see also Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth
Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 475, 527-28 (2005).
78
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
79
See Barnett, supra note 23, at 257.
80
Federal Judges Association, http://www.federaljudgesassoc.org (last visited Jan. 22, 2008).
81
Geyh, supra note 28, at 45; see also Cox, supra note 44, at 574-75 (“‘Bashing judges’ has become a long
and distinguished tradition, as we are often reminded by quotations from Thomas Jefferson, Abraham
Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt.”) (internal citations omitted). Such comments, as Judge Jenkins has
noted, often tell us much more about the speaker. See Bruce S. Jenkins, Is That a Fact? Evidence and the
Trial Lawyer, 12 UTAH BAR J. 19, 23 (1999).
82
Joan Biskupic, Hill Republicans Target “Judicial Activism” Conservatives Block Nominees, Threaten
Impeachment and Term Limits, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1997, at A1.
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Governor Gray Davis of California, when asked what should happen to a judge who
issues an opinion contrary to his own, stated that such an individual “shouldn’t be a
judge. They should resign. My appointees should reflect my views. They are not there
to be independent agents.” 83 Tennessee Governor Don Sundquist, after a Tennessee
Supreme Court Justice was voted out of her seat on the basis of a single death penalty
decision that he opposed and helped distort to the voting public, remarked: “Should a
judge look over his shoulder to the next election in determining how to rule on a case? I
hope so. I hope so.” 84
¶24
Although judge-bashing has a long and distinguished history, 85 the practice has,
according to many within the legal profession, reached unprecedented heights. 86 To be
sure, numerous jurists have concluded that today’s courts face unrivaled amounts of
inappropriate disparagement. 87 Justice O’Connor, for example, has stated that “the
breadth and intensity of rage currently being leveled at the judiciary may be unmatched in
American history.” 88 United States District Court Judge Paul Friedman, in light of the
attacks being launched on the courts, concluded: “It is hard to remember a time when
judges, courts, and the judicial branch in general were subjected to so much gratuitous
criticism, vitriolic commentary, and purposely misleading attacks. . . . if this current,
often politically motivated drumbeat against judges continues unchallenged, more and
more people . . . will lose faith not just in the courts but in the rule of law itself.” 89
¶25
Noting this harsh political landscape in which today’s judges operate, it is
imperative that we afford judges—judges who are called upon to protect the rights and
liberties of all and declare what the “law is” 90 in the face of harsh criticism, public
outrage or misunderstanding—sufficient protection and independence to exercise wisdom
and courage in their legal decision making. Do we really want judges to feel intimidated,
to look over their shoulders, or to simply be mannequins in the hands of a governor in
deciding legal questions? Do we really want judges—who have been called idiots,
buffoons, bandits, or stooges—to feel that they must issue decisions that will avoid such
public descriptions and preserve their jobs? In answering this question, one need only
consider where we would be as a society if the Justices in Brown v. Board of Education 91
reflected the views of popular politics or paused to look over their shoulders before
rendering this monumental decision.
¶26
Our founders sought to afford every individual who had his or her day in an
American court a thoughtful, neutral, evenhanded, and unbiased judge who would follow
the applicable principles of law when ruling on a case. Individual liberties, as well as
continued public respect for the court, depend upon this independence. In the spirit of
this noble and worthy aspiration, all states should strive to protect and further the
83

Transcript of Governor’s Comments on Judges, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 29, 2000, at 8.
Penny J. White et al., Breaking the Most Vulnerable Branch: Do Rising Threats to Judicial Independence
Preclude Due Process in Capital Cases? 31 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 123, 140 (1999).
85
See Sandra Day O’Connor, The Threat to Judicial Independence, THE BENCHER 10 (Jan./Feb. 2007); see
also Campbell, supra note 25, at B1.
86
See O’Connor, supra note 85, at 10.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
See Traynor, supra note 40, at 496-97.
90
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-78 (1803).
91
347 U.S. 483, 483 (1954).
84
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autonomy of the judiciary. For our forefathers, freeing judges from the control of the
King and affording them life tenure and a fixed salary was essential to achieving judicial
independence. In the next section, this article discusses why, in our day and time, states
must eliminate judicial elections to protect the independence of the court.
III. JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, SEAT G, AND SJR2
¶27

Having discussed what judicial independence is, the various historical and
contemporary views regarding the importance of judicial independence to individual
liberties and public respect for the court, as well as the harsh political environment in
which judges now operate, this article now looks at how judicial elections, as currently
used by various states, threaten the independence of the judiciary. Further, this section
illustrates why, in the spirit of our forefathers’ aspiration for an independent judiciary, all
states should abandon judicial elections.
¶28
The section begins by examining the views of our founders and the original thirteen
states regarding judicial elections, and discusses why our forefathers believed judicial
elections were dangerous. This section then looks at when and why the practice of
judicial elections began in the states and examines the negative consequences these
elections have had upon the independence of the judiciary. As an example of the
impropriety of judicial elections, this section looks at two recent judicial elections in
Texas and Tennessee, and then reviews the subsequent United States Supreme Court
decision in White v. Republican Party of Minnesota, 92 wherein Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence explicitly condemned the use of judicial elections. This section then turns to
the Seat G race—a race that has broken new ground and illustrates all of the problems
inherent in judicial elections—and discusses how this race has drastically broadened the
dangers of judicial elections. After discussing the impropriety of the Seat G race, this
section then examines SJR2—which was recently enacted by the Nevada legislature—
and argues that Article VI, Section 22 of the Nevada Constitution should be amended in
the next legislative session to completely eliminate judicial elections in Nevada.
¶29
Not only did Hamilton and the federalists believe that life tenure and a fixed salary
for judges was vital to securing the independence of the court,93 they also believed that
judicial elections were precarious and a serious threat to the autonomy of the judiciary. 94
Indeed, Hamilton believed that judicial elections, much like the ability of the King to
control a judge’s tenure and pay, threatened the very foundation of America’s proposed
legal system. 95 Even the anti-federalists, who were extremely suspicious of the power of
the courts to conduct judicial review and who desired to have judicial decisions subject to
the review of the legislature, believed that judicial elections were dangerous. 96
¶30
The original thirteen states shared the views of federalists, anti-federalists, and
authors of the Constitution regarding the impropriety of judicial elections, as evidenced
92

536 U.S. 765, 789 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
See THE ANTIFEDERALIST NO. 78, at 224-25 (“Brutus”) (Morton Borden ed., 1965) (“It would be
improper that the judicial [branch] should be elective, because their business requires . . . that they may
maintain firmness and steadiness in their decisions.”).
94
See Stephen Shapiro, The Judiciary in the United States: A Search for Fairness, Independence, and
Competence, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 667, 671 (2001).
95
See Judith L. Maute, Selecting Justice in State Courts: The Ballot Box or the Backroom?, 41 S. TEX. L.
REV. 1197, 1201 (2000).
96
Id.
93
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by the fact that all thirteen states, just like the federal government, originally appointed,
not elected, judges to the bench. 97 Indeed, it was not until the early nineteenth century
that judicial elections were introduced among the states as a form of appointing judges to
the bench. 98 Prior to this time, judicial elections were, in the words of one commentator,
“unheard of.” 99
¶31
Judicial elections began in the states in the early 1830s during Andrew Jackson’s
presidency and his pursuit of Jeffersonian ideals. 100 At this time in history, there was a
push toward public control of all aspects of government. According to this rising mode
of thought, in a democratic society, the populace, not an elite few, should have control
over all aspects of government, including, of course, the judiciary. 101 Accordingly,
Jacksonians sought to establish state judicial elections so that the general populace could
exercise broader control of public office, wrest power from the politically influential,102
increase judicial accountability, 103 and, particularly in the southern states, break up the
stronghold that white males had on the judiciary. 104 From 1846 to 1860, Jackson’s vision
gained strength and America saw nineteen states adopt constitutions providing for
judicial elections. 105 During the 1860s, twenty-two states elected their judges. 106
Currently, thirty-nine states elect some or all of the members of their bench. 107
¶32
Although judicial elections were fueled and forged by worthy ideals, such as pure
democracy and judicial accountability, the results and consequences of judicial elections
have, in practice, turned out to be much worse than the method devised by the founders.
To be sure, by the early 1900s, the problems of judicial elections began to rear their ugly
heads, and those states that adopted and employed judicial elections began to see, among
other problems, an “emergence of strong political party machines in large urban areas and
various states [that] resulted in political bosses effectively hand-picking incompetent
political hacks for judicial positions who then, through party-controlled elections,
replaced otherwise competent nonpolitically favored judges.” 108 Indeed, the judiciary, in

97

See Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and Issues, 49 U. MIAMI L. Rev. 1,
5 (1994). One commentator has noted that provisions in state constitutions, such as the Massachusetts
Constitution’s provision for life tenure (championed by John Adams), may well have served as a model for
Article III. See Carlton, Jr., supra note 10, at 836; cf. Hiller B. Zobel, Judicial Independence and the Need
to Please, JUDGES’ J., Fall 2001, at 5, 8 (quoting John Adams’s belief that judges should be “‘free,
impartial, and independent as the lot of humanity will admit’”).
98
See Grodin, supra note 9, at 1971.
99
Id.
100
Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to that Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections, the First
Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301, 311-12 (2003).
101
See, e.g., Rorie Sherman, Is Mississippi Turning?, 11 NAT’L L.J. 1 (1989).
102
See Dimino, supra note 100, at 310.
103
See Sobocinski, supra note 4, at 201.
104
Id.
105
James E. Lozier, The Missouri Plan A/K/A Merit Selection is the Best Solution for Selecting Michigan’s
Judges?, 75 MICH. B.J. 918, 919 (1996).
106
Id.
107
See Sobocinski, supra note 4, at 201-02.
108
Lozier, supra note 105, at 918; see also Kurt E. Scheuerman, Rethinking Judicial Elections, 72 OR. L.
REV. 459, 466 (1993) (“The innovation of electing judges soon proved to contain its share of problems.
Political machines began to control the selection of judges through the nomination process, and elections
became rubber stamps of the machine’s selections. This led to the creation of a politically responsive, yet
at times incompetent, judiciary.”).
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the words of one commentator, was seen as “corrupt, unethical, unqualified, and
incompetent.” 109
Since the early 1900s, the problems of judicial elections have steadily worsened,
and this method of placing judges on the bench has become increasingly dangerous. As
the Seat G election illustrates, the problems of judicial elections now pervade all forms of
dispute resolution in the states; in both criminal and civil actions, no claim brought in
state court is free from the problems inherent in judicial elections.
In contemplating the problems associated with judicial elections, consider two state
elections in Texas and Tennessee, along with Justice O’Connor’s subsequent concurrence
in White. These two elections—one a popular partisan election and one a Missouri plan
election, respectively—illustrate some of the many problems associated with judicial
elections. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in White points out how this method of
placing judges on the bench threatens the independence of the courts. The Texas and
Tennessee examples are, of course, by no means exhaustive, and one can find numerous
other state elections that mirror those of Texas and Tennessee. 110
In anticipation of the 1994 Texas judicial elections, after the highest criminal court
in Texas had reversed a conviction in a highly publicized capital case, the former
chairman of the state Republican Party made a state-wide call for the Republicans to take
over the court. 111 During the election, the Republicans provided a one-sided and distorted
view of the Texas Criminal Court’s holding to the voting public, stirred up public anger
and ultimately succeeded in placing numerous Republicans on the bench, including Judge
Stephen Mansfield. 112 Judge Mansfield, who had only been a member of the Texas bar
for two years, had been disciplined in Florida for practicing law without a license, and
who had completely misrepresented his academic writing on criminal law to the voting
public, ousted a much more qualified incumbent judge, a former prosecutor of twelve
years who had the support of the criminal bar. 113 Judge Mansfield, undoubtedly less
qualified than the incumbent, ran his campaign solely on the basis of the highly
publicized capital case on which the Republican Party focused and misrepresented to the
voting public. 114 To no one’s surprise, there was little discussion of Judge Mansfield’s
qualifications, such as his experience, publications, discipline, or ethics.
In the 1994 Tennessee Supreme Court election, Justice Penny White was appointed
to the Tennessee Supreme Court by the Governor to fill an existing vacancy on the high
court. 115 Justice White was subject to a retention vote in 1996. 116 Just prior to the
retention election, Justice White concurred in a decision reversing the death sentence of a
109

Rachel Paine Caufield, How the Pickers Pick: Finding a Set of Best Practices for Judicial Nominating
Commissions, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 163, 168 (2007).
110
See Roy A. Schotland, Financing Judicial Elections, 2000: Change and Challenge, 2001 L. REV.
M.S.U.-D.C.L. 849, 881 (2001) (noting that the problems of judicial elections occur in numerous states).
111
See, e.g., Janet Elliot & Richard Connelly, Mansfield: The Stealth Candidate; His Past Isn’t What It
Seems, TEX. LAW, Oct. 3, 1994, at 1.
112
See generally id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
See generally Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of State
Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1133 (1997).
116
See B. Michael Dann & Randall M. Hansen, National Summit on Improving Judicial Selection: Judicial
Retention Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1429, 1434 (2001). The case was State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18
(Tenn. 1996).
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criminal defendant in a highly publicized case. 117 Although the decision was well
grounded in law, 118 and despite the fact that no one (Tennessee Supreme Court Justices
included) enjoys giving or would ever want to give special treatment to a murderer,
Tennessee Governor Don Sundquist criticized and distorted 119 the decision to the voting
public. A special interest group simultaneously launched a smear campaign against
Justice White in the 1996 election and completely misled the voting public with respect
to Justice White’s concurrence. 120 Justice White, with little time and few resources to
combat the Governor’s attacks and the wealthy special interest ads in the news, lost the
election. 121 After less than two years on the bench, Justice White, on the basis of a single,
legally justifiable decision, was gone. Her qualifications, her accomplishments, her
mental acuity, and her judicial temperament were of no relevance to the voting public.
Justice White’s concurrence, which her opponent utterly distorted, was the sole criterion
by which she was measured.
¶37
The lessons of the Texas and Tennessee judicial elections are clear: if a judge
wishes to keep her seat on the bench in a state where judicial elections are employed, she
must consider the popular views of her constituents, even if that means sacrificing
constitutional guarantees for the vicissitudes of popular politics. Regardless of
qualifications or abilities, a judge who issues a single unpopular decision that goes
against the ideals of a special interest or political group may face strong opposition that
may lead to that judge’s removal. Further, unqualified candidates who are wealthy, have
wealthy backing, or who can potentially generate campaign money (a factor which, as
Justice O’Connor pointed out in White, is completely unrelated to judicial capacity) 122
will likely run for and win a seat on the bench over other more qualified candidates.
Judges who are ultimately successful in obtaining office must not only consider the
public’s views when issuing their legal decisions, but also be particularly cognizant of the
interests of donors or money players who can influence the public perception of their
views or record in the next election. Last, judicial elections—with their attendant
fundraising, campaign rhetoric, and smear tactics—have lowered the status and respect of
the court to the same level of a typical political campaign, where rhetoric and confusion,
not information or honest and thoughtful consideration of the candidates, predominates.
¶38
After the election debacles in Texas, Tennessee, and elsewhere, the United States
Supreme Court heard and decided White, 123 a case that dealt with speech restrictions
placed upon judicial candidates in Minnesota. Justice O’Connor, concurring with the
majority decision that struck down Minnesota’s ban on certain aspects of judicial election
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Id. In sum, the Odom court held that when various errors occurred during the penalty phase, a new
sentencing was required. Id.
118
See Penny J. White, Breaking the Most Vulnerable Branch: Do Rising Threats to Judicial Independence
Preclude Due Process in Capital Cases?, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 123, 138-39 (1999) (discussing
merits and justification of the Odom decision).
119
See Chief Justice Joseph E. Lambert, Contestable Judicial Elections: Maintaining Respectability in the
Post-White Era, 94 KY. L.J. 1, 11 (2005-06) (noting that Justice White was defeated because of a
“profound distortion of her death penalty views”).
120
See generally Dann & Hansen, supra note 116, at 1434.
121
Id.
122
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 789 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
123
Id at 788.
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speech, wrote separately to point out the many problems associated with judicial
elections. 124
¶39
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence brilliantly points out the numerous problems
inherent in judicial elections. The White opinion is a breath of fresh air from the high
court, particularly when considering the disturbing judicial elections just discussed in
Texas, Tennessee, and other states. It is also interesting to note that White was passed
down after years of legal commentary and numerous symposia condemning the use of
judicial elections, 125 along with various declarations from the ABA concluding
likewise. 126 Further, it is noteworthy that, although the question in White did not deal
directly with the question of the propriety of judicial elections (only speech limitations
placed on judicial candidates), 127 Justice O’Connor took the time and energy to write a
separate concurrence identifying the problems with judicial elections. It seems clear that,
in light of the timing and context of her comments, Justice O’Connor was trying to send a
powerful and clear message to the states regarding judicial elections.
¶40
In her concurrence discussing the problems of judicial elections, Justice O’Connor
first noted that judicial elections compromise a judge’s impartiality. 128 Specifically, she
stated that if “judges are subject to regular elections they are likely to feel that they have
at least some personal stake in the outcome of every publicized case. Elected judges
cannot help being aware that if the public is not satisfied with the outcome of a particular
case, it could hurt their reelection prospects.” 129 Justice O’Connor went on to explain that
even if judges did not pay attention to popular passions, and even if the vicissitudes of
popular politics did not compromise judicial impartiality, judicial elections create the
perception that judges could be influenced by popular views, and such a perception is, in
and of itself, dangerous and erodes the public confidence. 130
¶41
Secondly, Justice O’Connor noted the problems involved with judicial
campaigning. 131 In doing so, she noted that campaigning, a characteristic that is
“unrelated to judicial skill,” may encourage unqualified candidates who are wealthy to
run for judicial office. 132 In other words, judicial elections may attract incompetent or
inferior legal minds to the bench. Not only does campaigning lead to less qualified
candidates, it is also problematic because “relying on campaign donations may leave
124

Id. at 788-96.
See generally Phillips, supra note 5 (opening article for symposium by Ohio State); Eule, supra note 13;
see also Symposium, Judicial Review and Judicial Independence, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 737 (1998);
Symposium, A Symposium on Judicial Independence, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 703 (1997). Other events
include the University of Tulsa’s 1998 symposium entitled: “Judicial Independence—A Public Education
Symposium.” A similar symposium was held in 1998 at John Marshall Law School in Chicago entitled “A
Symposium on Judicial Independence.” Marquette University also held a symposium in 1998, which was
sponsored by the American Public Philosophy Institute and was entitled “Reining in Judicial Imperialism:
Effectively Limiting the Judiciary to its Constitutional Powers.” Numerous other symposia were held, all
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Reality, 36 JUDGES’ J. 8 (1997); Symposium, Judicial Independence: An Introduction, 80 JUDICATURE 155
(1997).
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See White, 536 U.S. at 765.
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judges feeling indebted to certain parties or interest groups.” 133 Once again, even if a
judge isn’t beholden or influenced by campaign contributions, the mere perception of
influence is sufficient, in and of itself, to undermine the public’s confidence. 134
Justice O’Connor’s observations regarding the evils of judicial elections are
pointed and informative when considering the Texas and Tennessee judicial elections
discussed supra. Indeed, in the Texas case, given that Judge Mansfield received so much
support from the Republican Party, it is likely that he will feel beholden to the
Republican Party and their interests when ruling on future cases, lest the Texas
Republicans call upon the party to remove Judge Mansfield in the next election.
Likewise, in Tennessee, it is difficult to believe that, given the fate of Justice White, a
future Tennessee Supreme Court Justice will issue a decision that works against
Governor Sundquist’s views or those of any other wealthy special interest group. If
nothing else, it would appear to the public that courts would consider these outside
factors, and the mere appearance of such impropriety is sufficient to lower the esteem of
the courts in the public’s eyes. Consider also the Texas election in light of Justice
O’Connor’s views regarding judicial campaigning. In Texas, Judge Mansfield—an
individual with much less judicial experience than the incumbent judge, no significant
academic writing experience, and who concealed disciplinary action taken against him—
replaced a much more qualified incumbent who had the support of the criminal bar.
Having briefly traced the genesis of judicial elections, from their inception to their
current status, and having elaborated upon a variety of the problems and views
denouncing this method of placing judges on the bench—from the United States Supreme
Court 135 to the world of academics 136 —as well as having discussed two recent examples
of disastrous state elections in which incumbents were ousted for issuing unpopular, yet
legally justifiable criminal decisions, this article now turns to the Seat G election.
The Seat G election is significant because it represents the first major judicial
election in which an incumbent justice was ousted on the basis of a single, unpopular civil
decision. As such, this election demonstrates that if judges wish to keep their jobs, they
must now make all of their legal decisions with an eye toward public sentiment (much to
the joy of a variety of newspapers, Governor Sundquist, and Tom DeLay, no doubt) and
the next election. Given that judges are being ousted for unpopular decisions in both civil
and criminal decisions, it is imperative that states, now, more than ever, abandon judicial
elections.
To fully and fairly understand the Seat G election and its implications, one must
appreciate the context in which the election occurred as well as comprehend the
circumstances that led up to this groundbreaking judicial race. Below is an account of the
Seat G election, beginning with the controversial Nevada Supreme Court decision in
Guinn. This section begins by discussing the circumstances surrounding Guinn and the
majority’s opinion in the case. The discussion then turns to the Seat G election and how
it presents a new and even more dangerous threat to judicial independence. This section
concludes with a look at SJR2 and Section 22 of the Nevada Constitution (which SJR2
133

See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 790 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 788.
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See generally Phillips, supra note 5 (opening article for a symposium by Ohio State); Eule, supra note
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amended), Nevada’s response to the judicial elections, and a discussion of why the
Nevada legislature should amend Section 22 during the next legislative session.
A. Guinn v. Nevada State Legislature
¶46

Guinn came to the high court of Nevada (the high court did not go to Guinn—an
important fact to remember) 137 in the midst of a legislative crisis and a political stalemate.
But for the court’s intercession in this crisis, Nevada’s public school system would have
collapsed. “Schools ha[d] not been funded for the upcoming school year. Teachers ha[d]
not been hired. Educational programs ha[d] been eliminated. Planning for the academic
year [was] not possible, and the state’s bond rating may [have] been jeopardized.” 138
Indeed, had this legislative standoff in Nevada continued and the court not interceded,
there would have been dire consequences for Nevada’s children.
¶47
In Guinn, the Nevada legislature, which is responsible for funding education under
the Nevada Constitution, could not agree upon the amount of funds to be appropriated to
education; 139 specifically, the legislature failed to balance the State budget by the end of
the legislative session. 140 As a result, Nevada’s public education system faced a
meltdown. 141 Even after the legislature called two special sessions to resolve the crisis, it
still could not agree on a budget. 142 Finally, in an attempt to resolve the crisis, the
Governor petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus, asking the Nevada Supreme Court
to order the legislature to perform its constitutional duty to approve a budget for
education so that the legislature could provide the children of Nevada with an
education. 143
¶48
The Guinn court was asked to examine and reconcile several provisions of the
Nevada Constitution ostensibly pitted against each other: Article 9, Section 2, which
requires the legislature to approve a balanced budget; Article 11, Section 6, which
mandates that the legislature fund public education; and Article 4, Section 18(2), which
requires a two-thirds supermajority to generate or increase public revenue to fund those
appropriations. 144 In the end, the Guinn court (in light of the constitutional mandate
requiring the legislature to provide an education to the children of Nevada) ordered the
legislature to fulfill its constitutional obligation to approve a budget for education and
balance the budget. Specifically, the high court held that Article 4, Section 18(2) of the
Nevada Constitution must yield to Article 11, Section 6 and Article 9, Section 2 of the
Nevada Constitution, which require the Nevada legislature to fund education and approve
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See Jenkins, supra note 76, at 126. Judge Jenkins, in discussing the term “judicial activism,” points out
that courts are not active; they do not seek business.
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Guinn v. Nevada State Legislature, 71 P.3d 1269, 1274 (Nev. 2003), overruled in part by Nevadans for
Nev. v. Beers, 142 P.3d 339 (Nev. 2006).
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Id.
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See id. at 1272.
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Id. at 1274 (“The Legislature’s failure to fulfill its constitutional duties by the beginning of the new
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Id.
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Id.
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a balanced budget, respectively. 145 To address the legislature’s impasse and the failure of
the two special sessions, the Court held that the legislature could bypass Article 4,
Section 18(2), and approve the educational budget by a simple majority. 146 As a
consequence, the legislature, not the court, imposed a tax via a simple majority vote to
raise money for public education. Funding was granted, and disaster was avoided.
¶49
After the decision in Guinn, various legislators filed a petition for rehearing with
the Nevada Supreme Court. 147 The petition was denied. 148 Unsatisfied with this result,
these same legislators attacked the Guinn decision in federal court, once again failing.
The legislators ultimately filed a petition for writ of certiorari and this, too, was rejected
by the Supreme Court of the United States. 149 Consistent with both the Nevada state and
federal court decisions, commentators examining Guinn have concluded that the decision
was legally sound. 150
¶50
After rendering its decision in Guinn, the Nevada Supreme Court came under
heavy fire from the media 151 and special interest groups. Although it was the legislature,
not the court, that ultimately raised the taxes of the Nevadans, and despite the fact that
numerous legal scholars have concluded the Guinn decision was sound 152 and the United
States Supreme Court denied review of Guinn 153 (for whatever reason, we do not know
for sure), the local media and various special interest groups preyed upon the decision, 154
distorted the holding to the public, 155 and created a significant amount of unwarranted
public upheaval and disdain for the court.156 Indeed, the media and special interest
groups’ distortion of the decision was so pervasive and malignant that Justice Agosti, the
145
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author of the Guinn opinion, likened their coverage and evaluation of Guinn to
propaganda. 157
B. Seat G
¶51

Four years after the issuance of the Guinn opinion, Justice Becker, who concurred
in the Guinn decision, was set to run for reelection. Justice Becker was the only justice
from the Guinn court who faced reelection. The 2006 Seat G election pitted Becker
against then-District Judge Nancy Saitta. Judge Saitta’s qualifications, like those of
Judge Mansfield from Texas, were less than impressive. She was the most reversed
District Court Judge in Nevada and an extremely inefficient lower court judge, 158 who
had not published a single opinion 159 or academic article. Further, at the time of this
article’s publication, she has not published a single academic article. 160 Moreover, not
only was Saitta unqualified for the Supreme Court, but she was also tied to several
wealthy special interest groups who sought to oust Justice Becker. 161 Additionally, she
had, in the past, presided over and ruled in favor of several controversial cases involving
campaign contributors. 162 Much like the elections in Texas and Tennessee, however,
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See Matt Pordum, Nevada Judges Do Well When Cases Are Reviewed in Nevada, LAS VEGAS SUN, Apr.
19, 2006, at A1. These numbers are based on a thirty-two month study conducted by a University of
Illinois Urbana-Champaign journalism class.
159
Then-Judge Saitta did have two unpublished opinions, which were found on Westlaw: Wozniak v.
Sahara Outpatient Surgery Ctr. Ltd., No. A457045, 2004 WL 3244352 (D. Nev. June 30, 2004) and
Purrier v. Chemical Lime Comp. of Arizona, No. A429375, 2004 WL 3203140 (D. Nev. Sept. 8, 2004).
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more than simple clerical Judicial Orders which do nothing more than memorialize who prevailed in the
action and describe the amount of money awarded. Both Wozniak and Purrier are judgments from trials,
less than one page in length each. Neither opinion engages in any type of factual or legal analysis
whatsoever. Moreover, it is likely that these unpublished opinions were not even written by then-Judge
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A Lexis and Westlaw search revealed no publications—although my research did uncover one law
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Judicial Selection and Evaluation, 4 NEV. L.J. 61 (2003). This is not, however, a publication. Justice
Becker had, on the other hand, published several hundred opinions in her capacity as a justice on the
Nevada Supreme Court. Although Saitta was not a justice and Becker was (and thus had the opportunity to
publish), the point is that, at the time of the election, Becker had significant writing experience and Saitta
did not. Because writing and publishing opinions is integral to the position of a judge, particularly a
Supreme Court justice, it is clear why publications are a probative factor in assessing the qualifications of a
candidate. Indeed, recognizing the importance of publications to a potential nominee to the bench, the
American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary (a committee that rates federal
judgeships) looks at a nominee’s prior publications in evaluating the quality of a potential judge. The more
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Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL.
L. REV. 23 (2004).
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See Jeff German, Far Right Targets Justice Becker: Supreme Court Vote on Tax Increase Was Right
Thing To Do, She Says, LAS VEGAS SUN, Oct. 15, 2007, at A1.
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See Goodman & Rempel, supra note 6, at B5.
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qualifications did not matter in this election as Judge Saitta put the entire focus of the
election on the Guinn case. 163
¶52
Throughout the Seat G race, Saitta continued with the propaganda that the media
had fed the voting public regarding Guinn. Indeed, Saitta—without mentioning or
otherwise alluding to the fact that Guinn came to the Nevada Supreme Court under dire
circumstances, without even referencing the fact that it was the legislature, not the court,
who was responsible for the tax increase, and without even bringing up the fact that the
United States Supreme Court had declined to review the Nevada Supreme Court’s
decision—accused Justice Becker of “judicial activism.” 164 Moreover, in a statement of
utter boldness and irresponsibility, Saitta claimed that the Guinn court had “ignored the
Constitution,” 165 as if a justice would, or could, in any sense of the term “ignore,” to wit,
“refrain from noticing or recognizing” 166 a constitutional provision that lies at the very
heart of the matter under consideration. 167
¶53
In the end, Saitta—despite being obviously less qualified—ousted Justice Becker,
an established and solid jurist. 168 Saitta’s campaign against Becker, which was based
largely on a single, politically unpopular decision that had been previously maligned in
the media, helped Saitta win Seat G. 169 It appears that for the first time in American
history, a sitting State Supreme Court justice was ousted on the basis of a single, legally
justifiable, yet politically unpopular, opinion in a civil decision.
¶54
Seat G teaches several important lessons regarding the dangers of judicial elections.
These unfortunate lessons wonderfully illustrate the new dangers which judicial elections
now pose to liberty in America and demonstrate why states should do everything within
their power to abandon this flawed method of placing judges on the bench. After this
section discusses the lessons of Seat G, it discusses SJR2 and Article VI, Section 22 of
the Nevada Constitution (which SJR2 amended), and demonstrates how the amendments
to Section 22 are insufficient to promote judicial independence and to protect Nevada
from yet again experiencing the problems of judicial elections. Ergo, this article urges
163

See German, supra note 161.
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the Nevada legislature to amend Section 22 in the next legislative session to eliminate all
forms of judicial elections in Nevada.
¶55
The first (and most important) lesson of Seat G is that in states where judicial
elections are held, if judges want to keep their jobs, they are not free to make even a
single, politically unpopular, yet legally justifiable decision. Indeed, it illustrates that
those judges who do make socially or politically unpopular decisions, regardless of the
legal justification, do so at their own peril. 170 This fact is alarming, and one cannot
overemphasize the danger of this occurrence. As the ABA has stated:
Never is there more potential for judicial accountability being distorted
and judicial independence being jeopardized than when a judge is
campaigned against because of a stand on a single issue or even in a single
case. In such a situation, it is particularly important for lawyers to support
the judicial process and the rule of law. 171
¶56

The Seat G election is even more alarming, however, because it demonstrates that
the problems of judicial elections have now spread into the civil realm of dispute
resolution. Indeed, it appears that Seat G is the first major judicial election in which an
incumbent was ousted on the basis of an unpopular civil decision. 172 This expansion into
the civil realm of dispute resolution, in conjunction with the unprecedented attacks that
the judiciary faces, should strike terror in the reader—as it did with federalists 173 and antifederalists. 174 Indeed, Seat G teaches that now, no dispute or individual right brought
before a state court—civil or criminal—is safe from the pressures and dangers that
judicial elections exert. This fact undoubtedly represents the most dangerous period of
judicial elections in the history of America.
¶57
In the Seat G election, it was Justice Becker’s unpopular concurrence in Guinn and
the subsequent distortion of that decision to the voting public that directly caused Becker
to lose her seat to the less-qualified Saitta. This reality seriously jeopardizes the rights of
every citizen and undermines the validity of the legal system as a whole. Indeed, it
teaches that the law may take a back seat to popular politics. Systems of appointment
that create this type of scenario should be shunned. Indeed, as Justice Stevens stated, “it
was ‘never contemplated that the individual who has to protect our individual rights
would have to consider what decision would produce the most votes.’” 175
170

See supra notes 109-121 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial elections in Texas and
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See TASK FORCE ON LAWYERS’ POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS, AM. BAR ASS’N, 2 REPORT AND
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Second, the Seat G race fortifies Justice O’Connor’s 176 observation that popular
elections will attract only those who are wealthy, or who have the ability to run an
expensive campaign, and thereby potentially decrease the likelihood that the most
qualified candidates will run for and be elected to the bench. As discussed earlier, Saitta
is much like Judge Mansfield in the Texas judicial election discussed supra: she was the
most reversed judge in Nevada and an extremely inefficient lower court judge, 177 with no
academic publications or published legal opinions. 178 Nonetheless, Saitta had the
powerful backing of various wealthy special interest groups who sought to oust Justice
Becker. 179 Indeed, it is well known that Saitta was approached by certain powerful and
wealthy attorneys in Nevada who wanted to remove Becker because she had issued
decisions that were contrary to a variety of the interests they frequently represented. 180 In
this election, it was Saitta’s capacity to use wealthy special interest groups—an ability
unrelated to judicial skill 181 —that allowed her to win the race, not her qualifications.
¶59
Third, Seat G illustrates the dangers associated with judges being beholden to
campaign contributors. As Justice O’Connor noted in White, judges who solicit and
receive campaign contributions for a judicial election may feel indebted to those
campaign contributors. 182 This is a very real danger in Nevada; indeed, prior to the Seat
G election, the L.A. Times issued articles that rocked Nevada, detailing instances in which
Saitta heard cases involving campaign contributors and ruled favorably for those
campaign contributors. 183 Moreover, Saitta is now indebted to the group of powerful
interest groups in Nevada who financed her campaign. 184 In light of these facts, can one
seriously argue that if an issue arises before the Nevada Supreme Court that involves an
issue in which one of Saitta’s large campaign donors has a significant interest, Saitta
would be independent? 185 The mere fact that she took money, let alone large amounts of
money, from such donors requires an answer in the negative. At best, these facts create
the glaring appearance of being beholden to such contributors.
¶60
Fourth, the Seat G election and its attendant campaign rhetoric illustrate how
judicial campaigns are becoming “nosier, nastier and costlier,” 186 and demonstrate how
¶58

176

Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
See Pordum, supra note 158.
178
See supra notes 159-160 and accompanying text. Saitta was not wholly without experience prior to her
election to the high court, however. Prior to the Seat G race Saitta was a district court judge in Nevada and
a municipal court judge in Las Vegas prior to that. See Washoe County, Candidate Information, supra note
164. However, as discussed earlier, Saitta was the most reversed district judge and had not published a
single opinion as a judge, nor had she published a single academic article. Because legal writing is one of
the most important skills a Supreme Court Justice must possess, Saitta’s lack of any scholarly or judicial
writing as a judge is extremely disconcerting and demonstrates her lack of qualifications. See supra notes
159-160 and accompanying text.
179
See German, supra note 161; see also Sam Skolnik, Who Owes Whom is Supreme Theme: Becker, Saitta
Race is Rife With Accusations, LAS VEGAS SUN, Aug. 27, 2006, at A1.
180
Id.
181
See White, 536 U.S. at 789.
182
Id.
183
See Goodman & Rempel, supra note 6, at B5.
184
See German, supra note 161; see also Skolnik, supra note 179.
185
White, 536 U.S. at 788 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Anthony Champagne, Access to Justice:
Can Business Coexist with the Civil Justice System?, 38 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 1483, 1512 (2005) (noting that
judicial candidates, if they want to be elected or retained, must “show that they are friendly to the goals of
the group”).
186
David B. Rottman & Roy A. Schotland, What Makes Judicial Elections Unique?, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
177
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judicial elections are lowering the traditional respect for the courts and the rule of law. 187
In her campaign literature against Justice Becker in the Seat G race, Saitta told the voting
public that the Nevada Supreme Court’s decisions in deciding Guinn “ignored” 188 the
Constitution and engaged in “judicial activism,” 189 while simultaneously misrepresenting
the Guinn decision to the public by feeding them a one-sided and oversimplified version
of a rather complex case that was made under serious time-restraints and involved (and
ultimately benefited) the education of the children of Nevada. 190 Of course, as Justice
Agosti noted, these statements were extreme, one-sided, and simply inaccurate. 191
Saitta’s statements were nothing more than typical political rhetoric. Despite Saitta’s
assertions to the contrary, there was no “judicial activism” in the Guinn decision, nor did
the Nevada Supreme Court “ignore” the Nevada Constitution (a claim that is
unconscionable when considering the fact that the disputed provisions of the Nevada
Constitution are expressly discussed throughout the Guinn opinion). 192
¶61
Like many cases, the Guinn decision is not problem free. However, the Nevada
Supreme Court, in passing upon the merits of the case in the midst of a legislative
emergency, was not active in soliciting, receiving, or deciding the case; to be sure, the
court did not seek out the petition for a writ of mandamus. Rather, the Court took what
came, “and within the tradition of service and the boundaries of power and competency
[did] the best [it could] to deal with questions put to [it] by others.” 193 In Guinn, the
Nevada Supreme Court knew that it had been handed a political hot potato when it
received the petition from Governor Guinn and, in all reality, the high court probably
would have rather avoided touching the question. But, pursuant to its constitutional duty,
it did not. Neither Justice Becker, nor the Nevada Supreme Court for that matter,
“ignored” the Constitution. In fact, the court did just the opposite and tackled the
difficult issue head-on.
¶62
The provision that Saitta accused Justice Becker and the Nevada Supreme Court of
“ignoring” is expressly discussed and analyzed numerous times in the Guinn opinion, 194
and no informed jurist, commentator, or responsible citizen could, after reading the
opinion and giving it thoughtful consideration, ever conclude that the Guinn court was
“activist,” or that the high court had “ignored” the Constitution. 195 At best, even if Saitta
did not agree with the Guinn opinion, concluding that the court was “activist” and had
“ignored” the constitution is a contemptuous assertion, particularly in light of the United

1369, 1373 n.5 (2001) (quoting Richard Woodbury, Is Texas Justice For Sale?, TIME, Jan. 11, 1988, at 74).
187
See Hon. Hugh Maddox, Taking Politics Out of Judicial Elections, 23 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 329, 335
(1999) (noting that judicial elections have created a “dangerous decline in the public's faith in impartiality
of the judicial branch of government”).
188
See Nancy Saitta Website, supra note 164.
189
Id.
190
See Guinn v. Nevada State Legislature, 71 P.3d 1269, 1281 (Nev. 2003), overruled in part by Nevadans
for Nev. v. Beers, 142 P.3d 339 (Nev. 2006).
191
See Agosti, supra note 9, at 881.
192
See generally Guinn, 71 P.3d at 1272.
193
See Jenkins, supra note 76, at 293.
194
See generally Guinn, 71 P.3d at 1272. Given the explicit discussion of the Constitution in the opinion, it
is beyond comprehension how one could ever contend that the Nevada Supreme Court ignored the
Constitution.
195
See Popkin, supra note 150, at 308-09; Johnson, supra note 150, at 491.
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States Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari 196 and the numerous academic articles opining
otherwise. 197
¶63
Saitta’s campaign claims against Justice Becker were—to say the least—grossly
distorted and “shameless[ly]” 198 and unequivocally hurt the image and public respect for
the Court. 199 How can the public respect the judiciary when such blatant
misrepresentations and nasty attacks are made in a judicial race? The foregoing problems
with Seat G illustrate how such campaign rhetoric destroys the traditional respect for the
bench. Indeed, the Seat G rhetoric and misrepresentations demonstrate why today’s
public views judicial elections the same way as a typical political race: poorly. 200
¶64
Fifth, the Seat G election teaches a great deal about what the public can expect
from candidates in future judicial elections. Saitta’s record speaks for itself: she was the
most reversed district judge in the State of Nevada; 201 an extremely inefficient adjudicator
of justice (as evidenced by the large backlog of cases, many of which reached back three
years) with no legal or academic publications; 202 an individual tied to wealthy special
interests who wanted to oust Justice Becker; 203 and a judge who presided over and
rendered questionable rulings in favor of campaign contributors. 204 Yet, despite her poor
credentials, she won the election. Noting this fact, it is likely that in future judicial
elections the candidates, instead of focusing on relevant factors and responsibly
campaigning, will engage in the same smear tactics and distortion as did Saitta. Indeed,
Seat G teaches candidates that if they shift the focus of the campaign and misrepresent
selected issues, they may prevail despite a lack of experience, scholarly work, or poor
legal record. As such, those individuals who “covet higher office” 205 will likely mimic
such tactics instead of running campaigns that are truly focused on the issues and those
qualities that are probative in assessing someone’s capacity to serve on the bench.
C. SJR2
¶65

After years of problems with judicial elections in Nevada, with the independence of
Nevada courts hanging by a string, and after being embarrassed by recent news articles in
the L.A. Times 206 regarding the Seat G election, on February 13, 2007, several Nevada
legislators introduced SJR2, seeking to amend the Nevada Constitution to eliminate
popular judicial elections. In sum, SJR2 was aimed at eliminating Nevada’s practice of
popular elections and sought to replace this system with the “Missouri plan,” a practice
whereby judges are appointed by the Governor (after being recommended by a
nominating commission) and subject to a retention vote after six years, wherein a judicial
196

See Angle v. Legislature of Nev., 543 U.S. 1120 (2005) (denying petition for writ of certiorari).
See Popkin, supra note 150, at 308-09; Johnson, supra note 150, at 491.
198
See Ralston, supra note 19.
199
See Maddox, supra note 187, at 335 (noting that judicial elections have created a “dangerous decline in
the public’s faith in the impartiality of the judicial branch of government”).
200
Id.; see also Caufield, supra note 109, at 168 (noting that judicial elections have caused the public to
view the judiciary as “corrupt, unethical, unqualified, and incompetent”).
201
See Pordum, supra note 158.
202
See supra text accompanying note 160.
203
See German, supra note 161; see also Skolnik, supra note 179.
204
See Goodman & Rempel, supra note 6, at B5.
205
Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 519 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
206
See Goodman & Rempel, supra note 6, at B5.
197
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commission will issue a report for the public recommending whether to retain the justice
or judge. 207 SJR2 also mandates that those justices or judges who currently sit on the
bench and desire to continue to serve in their office are also subject to a future retention
vote and must declare their candidacy by July 11, 2011. 208
¶66
On March 8, 2007, the Nevada Judiciary Committee held hearings on SJR2.
Various politicians, citizens, law professors, and groups testified for and against certain
aspects of SJR2. Senator William J. Raggio, one of the five senators who proposed SJR2
(and who supported similar legislation in 1972 and 1998 that was defeated), testified at a
hearing and explicitly discussed the underlying purposes of SJR2. Below are the relevant
excerpts from his testimony before the committee:
Elections have become nasty, uncivil and subject to partisan politics.
[J]udicial candidates [are] sitting in outer offices soliciting contributions
from attorneys . . . . Recently, there was a series in the Los Angeles media
which was termed an exposé of the judicial system in Clark County. It
gave examples of political solicitations and contributions alleged to have
crossed the line.
Too many special interest groups want to place undue pressure on the
judiciary to follow their issues. Some groups want to jail judges if they do
not go along with what they perceive to be an appropriate decision.
Judges should not live in fear or favor in making their decisions.
[J]udges who have been appointed to fill vacancies in the [Nevada]
process measure up better than many judges who are initially elected. 209
¶67

SJR2, to no surprise, received a warm welcome from the Senate and Assembly
judiciary committees, as well as both houses of the Nevada legislature. SJR2 passed in
both Houses with no substantive amendments and was sent for signature on May 31,
2007. 210 Not only was SJR2 treated well in the legislature, but SJR2 also received strong
support from the Nevada populace, as evidenced by the assortment of groups, such as the
Nevada State Bar, which supported the resolution. 211
¶68
Although SJR2 is a step in the right direction in bolstering judicial autonomy, the
amendments SJR2 made to Article VI of the Nevada Constitution are fatally flawed and
simply will not eliminate the problems Senator Raggio identified as driving the
resolution. Indeed, SJR2 should not include a retention vote provision. One need only
consider the judicial election debacle involving Justice Penny White on the Tennessee
Supreme Court when considering the problems which will continue to attend judicial
207

S.J. Res. 2, 74th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2007).
Id.
209
See Nevada Legislature, Minutes of the Senate Committee on Judiciary, Mar. 8, 2007,
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/74th/Minutes/Senate/JUD/Final/486.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2008).
210
See Nevada Legislature, Bill History of SJR2, http://www.leg.state.nv.us/74th/Reports/history.cfm?
DocumentType=8&BillNo=2 (last visited Jan. 22, 2008).
211
See Nevada State Bar, White Paper, http://www.nvbar.org/pdf/sjr2whitepaper.pdf (last visited Jan 22,
2008).
208
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elections in Nevada unless Article VI, Section 22 of the Nevada Constitution is amended.
The Tennessee Supreme Court race, remember, did not involve a popular vote; it
involved a retention vote. 212 Although Tennessee employed the Missouri plan and did
not use popular elections (which is essentially identical to what SJR2 did to the Nevada
Constitution), the Governor of Tennessee and various wealthy special interest groups in
Tennessee were still able to run distorted campaigns against Justice White based solely
on one socially unpopular, yet legally justifiable, decision. And, in the end, Justice White
was ousted.
¶69
As a practical matter, the only real difference between Article VI, Section 22 as
amended and Nevada’s previous method of popular elections is that under the new
Article VI, Section 22, judges will be initially appointed to the bench by the Governor
instead of being elected by popular vote. But this difference does not make a difference.
Indeed, the only benefit this change would bring would be to prevent inexperienced
candidates (who were only there because of their wealth) 213 from running and being
elected to the bench. Aside from this marginal benefit, however, every other problem
Nevada experienced with popular judicial elections will remain under Article VI, Section
22. Judges will still solicit donations. Judges will still run campaigns, truthful or not.
Judges will still be beholden to campaign contributors. As such, Article VI, Section 22,
as it now reads, is a failure and will not protect and promote judicial independence as a
whole and cannot cure the problems which Senator Raggio identified as driving the
resolution. 214 Indeed, because Nevada retained a retention vote in its appointment method
for judgeships, Nevada will continue to see incumbents campaigning, incumbents
soliciting contributions, and special interest and political groups mounting attacks on
candidates.
¶70
The foregoing realities demonstrate the dire need for the Nevada legislature to
rethink and amend Section 22 of the Nevada Constitution to eliminate judicial elections
completely. Indeed, given the undeniable failure of the Missouri plan in those states that
have adopted retention elections (e.g., Tennessee), it is imperative that the Nevada
legislature rethink and rewrite Article VI, Section 22 so that the independence of
Nevada’s judiciary can be bolstered and the problems that Senator Raggio identified may
be eliminated.
¶71
To eliminate the problems of judicial elections and bolster judicial independence,
this article proposes that SJR2 be amended to delete the retention vote provision, and that
Section 22 be rewritten to provide for: (1) Senate confirmation of nominees appointed by
the Governor, (2) twelve-year judgeship terms, 215 and (3) a determination that all
212

See generally Uelman, supra note 115.
Cf. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788-89 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting
that “[u]nless the pool of judicial candidates is limited to those wealthy enough to independently fund their
campaigns, a limitation unrelated to judicial skill, the cost of campaigning requires judicial candidates to
engage in fundraising.”).
214
A retention vote means, of course, that there is no opposing candidate against whom to measure the
incumbent—another flaw in an already flawed social experiment.
215
Of course, in providing for fixed twelve-year terms, it would be preferable if all of the justices do not
leave the court at the same time. Indeed, given the complexity of the administrative aspects of a Supreme
Court, it would be highly desirable to have several justices on the bench when new justices arrive, so that
the new justices could learn the ropes, so to speak. This issue presents a problem in the initial
implementation of fixed twelve-year terms because if the twelve-year rule applies to all from the date of the
amendment (which will hopefully be in 2008), the Nevada Supreme Court would have seven new justices
in 2020. Given the current composition of the court, however, it is likely that the court could develop some
213
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justices/judges currently sitting on the bench prior to enactment of SJR2 are subject to
SJR2’s provisions (i.e., if a judge was elected three years ago, she will have nine more
years on the bench; if a judge was elected or re-elected one year ago, he or she will have
eleven years on the bench, etc.). 216 Specifically, I suggest that Sections 22 (1)-(9) be
completely deleted and rewritten as follows:
Section 22
1. Each Justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of Appeals, if
established, or judge of the District Court, shall be appointed by the
Governor, after being nominated by a nominating commission by and with
the consent of a majority of all the members elected to the Senate, for the
term of twelve (12) years each, with no reappointments thereafter, and the
persons so appointed shall enter upon the discharge of the duties of their
respective offices upon taking the oath of office prescribed by this
Constitution. Before sending the name of any person to the Senate for
confirmation as the appointment of the Governor to a vacancy in any
Judicial Office as aforesaid, the Governor shall, not less than ten (10) days
before sending the name of such person to the Senate for confirmation,
address a public letter to the President of the Senate informing him or her
that he or she intends to submit to the Senate for confirmation as an
appointment to such vacancy the name of the person he or she intends to
appoint.
2. All Justices or Judges in office prior to enactment of Section 22(1)-(2)
shall be subject to these provisions and shall be deemed in office for the

type of initial internal rule or agreement to provide for staggered departures. Presently, the Nevada
Supreme Court has two justices elected in 2007 (Justices Saitta and Cherry), three in 2004 (Justices
Douglas, Hardesty, and Parraguire), one in 2003 (Justice Gibbons) and one in 1996 (Chief Justice Maupin).
Worst case scenario, even if an internal rule could not be promulgated, the Nevada Legislature could
simply create a section in Article VI that starts the twelve-year time period from the time in which the
justice was initially appointed. Thus, Justices Saitta and Cherry would leave in 2019, Justices Douglas,
Hardesty and Parraguire would leave in 2016, Justice Gibbons in 2015. Of course, this method would only
be problematic for the Chief Justice, and the Nevada legislature could simply give him an initial extension
for a period of time that they deem reasonable.
216
At the early stages of implementation, it is possible that the Nevada Supreme Court may (depending on
the current composition and the amount of time before amendments are adopted) be in a position whereby
the Governor is able to stack the court with nominees from his party. This fact, of course, may be cause for
concern. Ergo, if it turns out that this may be a reality at the time of the adoption of the amendments
suggested above, the Nevada legislature may want to consider an addition to Section 22 of the Nevada
Constitution that would eliminate the possibility that the court is packed with nominees of only one party.
This issue is beyond the scope of this article, but the author suggests that, if this issue arises, the Nevada
legislature consider provisions from other states that have dealt with this problem. For example, in
Delaware, the legislature addressed the problem by adding the following provision to the Constitution:
Appointments to the office of the State Judiciary shall at all times be subject to all of the
following limitations: First, three of the five Justices of the Supreme Court in office at the same
time, shall be of one major political party, and two of said Justices shall be of the other major
political party.
DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
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amount of time the Justice or Judge has been in office since the most
recent election or appointment. 217
¶72

By amending Section 22 as suggested above, judicial elections will be eliminated in
Nevada, and so will the problems associated with this flawed and dangerous method. To
be sure, abolishing judicial elections from Nevada will not only eliminate the very real
possibility that judges may look to the next election when rendering their legal decisions,
but it will also remove the other serious problems discussed earlier, namely: (1) judicial
campaigning, (2) judges soliciting contributions, and (3) special interests running
campaigns against incumbents to have them removed for unpopular decisions. As a
result, the amendments that this article suggests to Article VI, Section 22 of the Nevada
Constitution will create a system of judicial appointment whereby judges need not
campaign or solicit contributions, and the potential for judges to feel beholden to wealthy
special interest or political parties will be non-existent, thus allowing Nevada judges to
make their decisions solely upon the rule of law and facts of the case.
¶73
Not only will amending Section 22 of the Nevada Constitution as suggested above
eliminate many of the problems with judicial elections and campaigning, but it will also
provide a balanced method of appointment that addresses the concerns of having judges
appointed by the executive branch. 218 Indeed, this article’s suggestions will provide for
the people, via their elected representatives, an opportunity to object to, or even prevent
217

This language was drawn, in large part, from Delaware’s Constitutional provision regarding judicial
appointment. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (Governor appoints judges and justices, with advice and consent
of the Senate, for twelve-year terms). It also resembles constitutional provisions or laws that are in place in
ten other states and the District of Columbia—all of which appoint judges to fixed terms with no retention
votes. See CONN. CONST. art. 5, § 2 (Governor nominates judges from a list that a judicial selection
commission submits, for eight-year terms); HAW. CONST. art. VI, § 3. (Governor appoints judges, from a
judicial selection commission's list of nominees and with consent of the Senate, for ten-year terms; judicial
selection commission determines retention); ME. CONST. art. 5, pt. 1, § 8 (Governor nominates judicial
officers, with confirmation by a committee from both houses of the legislature), art. 6, § 4 (judges hold
office for seven-year terms); MD. CONST. art. 4, § 41D (Governor appoints district court judges, with
advice and consent of the Senate, for ten-year terms); MASS. CONST. pt. 2, c. 2, § 1, art. 9 (Governor
appoints all judicial officers, with advice and consent of the Governor’s Council), pt. 2, c. 3, art. I (judicial
officers hold office during good behavior); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 46 (Governor and Council appoint
judicial officers), pt. 2, art. 73 (judges hold office during good behavior); N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 6, paras. 1, 3
(Governor appoints judges and justices, with confirmation by the Senate, for initial seven-year terms; upon
reappointment judges and justices serve during good behavior); N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 2 (Governor appoints
court of appeals judges, with advice and consent of the Senate, for fourteen-year terms); R.I. Const. art. X
§§ 4-5 (1994) (Governor appoints superior court and district court justices, with confirmation by the
Senate; justices hold office during good behavior); VT. CONST. ch. II, §§ 32, 34 (Governor appoints judges
from a judicial nominating body's list of candidates, with advice and consent of the Senate, for six-year
terms; general assembly votes for retention; general assembly can vote by simple majority to remove); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 11-1501 (1995) (President selects judges from names that a commission recommends, with
advice and consent of the Senate, for fifteen-year terms; judicial qualification commission reviews
performance).
218
Recently, Professors Calabresi and Lindgren called for the abolishment of life tenure for United States
Supreme Court Justices and proposed, among other things, fixed eighteen-year terms for the Justices. See
Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 769 (2006). In making this proposal, Professors Calabresi and Lindgren’s
proposal revolves around the major concerns of life tenure, which they claim are “the Court’s resistance to
democratic accountability, the increased politicization of the judicial confirmation process, and the
potential for greater mental decrepitude of those remaining too long on the bench.” Id. at 809. The
concerns of Professors Calabresi and Lindgren are applicable on the state level and are addressed by the
proposed amendments that this article makes to Article VI, Section 22 of the Nevada Constitution.
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certain judges who are clearly inexperienced, unqualified or perhaps radical, from sitting
on the bench. 219 Moreover, amending Section 22 of the Nevada Constitution as suggested
above will limit the time during which judges are in office so as to avoid the potential
that one political party will pack the court, as well as ensure that judges do not become
entrenched in their positions. 220 Additionally, fixed terms of twelve years will also ensure
that judges will be afforded a sufficient amount of time to learn their duties as judges so
that they may competently perform their judicial duties, while at the same time ensuring
that the court will continuously be provided with fresh minds. 221 Although disallowing
reappointment may, in some cases, preclude a competent and talented jurist from serving
on the bench in the future, it is unlikely that states would be unable to find new talent to
sit on the bench every twelve years. If issues arise as to reappointment and a state finds
that it is best to allow for reappointment, it is always free to add a provision within its
Constitution that would permit a judge or justice to be reappointed.
¶74
If the retention portions of Section 22 of the Nevada Constitution are not deleted,
Nevada will continue to experience virtually all of the same problems it has experienced
with popular judicial elections. Indeed, as the Justice Penny White debacle demonstrates,
nothing in Section 22 of the new Nevada Constitution will prevent another Seat G-like
catastrophe, and Nevada’s legislative attempt to bring respect and independence to the
judiciary will fail and bring Nevada back to square one. By amending Section 22 of the
Nevada Constitution as recommended, Nevada can avoid the pitfalls and evils of judicial
elections, and Nevada’s judicial branch of government can be freed from the problems of
electing judges to the bench. Further, amending Section 22 of the Nevada Constitution
will, on a much broader level, bolster the independence of the judiciary across America,
protect individual rights, and further the public’s respect for the judicial system as a
whole.
IV. CONCLUSION
¶75

The Seat G election illustrates the dire need for states to abandon judicial elections
in all forms. Indeed, given that the ills associated with judicial elections have now spread
into the civil realm of dispute resolution, this flawed Jacksonian method of placing judges
on the bench is more dangerous than ever before.
¶76
The framers of our federal Constitution “knew from history and experience that it
was necessary to protect . . . against judges too responsive to the voice of higher
219

Cf. Owen Fiss, Between Supremacy and Exclusivity, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 187, 201 (2007) (“Although
Justices of the Supreme Court are not elected, they owe their appointments to elected officials—the
President and the Senate.”).
220
One of the more prevalent concerns about life tenure is that judges will become too entrenched and
resistant to new ideas. Id. (noting that “life tenure of federal judges allows them to become entrenched and
to exercise power long after the political regime that empowered them has disappeared”); see generally
Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 218; Philip D. Oliver, Systematic Justice: A Proposed Constitutional
Amendment to Establish Fixed, Staggered Terms for Members of the United States Supreme Court, 47
OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 800 (1986). This concern, however, has no real bite. See Sheldon Goldman, Voting
Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 491, 499 (1975) (noting that, in
testing the “bureaucratic judicial arteries,” there was little evidence to support the hypothesis that tenured
judges make irresponsible or poor legal decisions); Gregory C. Sisk, Andrew P. Morriss & Michael Heise,
Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1377, 1486 (1998) (noting that life tenure does not cause senior federal judges to become entrenched
in their ways and resistant to new ideas).
221
See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 218, at 815-18.
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authority,” 222 and they took great pains to ensure that the new Republic that they had
formed had a strong and independent judiciary. 223 The American experience with judicial
elections, just like our forefathers’ painful experience with the King’s control of the
judiciary in colonial times, 224 counsels against judicial elections. To be sure, judicial
elections, as the Seat G election demonstrates, create a situation that may cause a judge to
be “too responsive to the voice of higher authority” 225 and threatens liberty and the
public’s respect of the judicial institution. When one considers the modern day evils of
judicial elections and their threat to judicial independence, to individual rights and to the
integrity and esteem of the court, in conjunction with the spread of these problems into
the civil realm of dispute resolution and the harsh political landscape in which judges
now operate, it is clear that Nevada, as well as all other states, should eliminate this
“disgraceful” 226 “scourge” 227 from society.
¶77
Given the increasing role of state courts in the protection of individual rights, 228 it is
imperative that states have methods of appointment in place that ensure that their judges
are independent and free to make decisions without fear of public reprisal. When a state
has a system in place that permits a judge to be displaced because of a single unpopular
decision, the entire process of orderly and peaceful adjudication of disputes is disrupted,
as well as the entire foundation of our court system. 229

222

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
See Cal. Chief Justice Ronald M. George, Challenges Facing an Independent Judiciary, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1345, 1346 (2005).
224
See supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
225
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156.
226
See TAFT, supra note 2, at 418.
227
See Fordham & Husted, Jr., supra note 2, at 61 (quoting Proceedings and Debates of the Virginia State
Convention of 1829-30, at 615-19 (1830)).
228
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In this final footnote, I would like to make it unequivocally clear that, just because judicial elections may
produce judges who are less qualified, and just because judicial elections may produce judges who may feel
compelled to consider outside influences in making legal decisions, I am not saying that all, or even the
majority of elected judges on the state level are less qualified, or that all state judges disregard what the law
compels them to do just because it may be politically unpopular. Indeed, prior to my clerkship with Judge
Greene on the federal level, I was a law clerk to Nevada State Senior District Judge James Brennan. Judge
Brennan was highly capable, bright, a published author, experienced, thoughtful, and did not consider, in
all the cases on which I worked for him, any improper outside influences or otherwise jeopardize his
independence as a judge. Although Judge Brennan was a senior judge and therefore not subject to the same
pressures as his colleagues who did not have senior status, I believe Judge Brennan represents the large
majority of judges in Nevada.
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